For all its drama and dismay, the election of 2016 might not end up being a ‘critical election,’ in the sense of marking a permanent change in the makeup or ideology of one or both of the parties. Whether the election ends up producing such change depends on which presidential candidate wins and how his or her party establishment behaves afterward.
If Hillary Clinton wins, her victory will mainly mark a continuation of the Obama years and of the centrism that has prevailed among Democrats since Bill Clinton’s presidency. Secretary Clinton adopted a progressive platform at the time of the 2016 Democratic convention to placate Sanders’ supporters, but the Democratic establishment in general has given few signs of having adopted a dramatically new constellation of ideas. Instead, the tenor of the campaign on the Democratic side has been defensive, couched in terms of defending past accomplishments and promising to advance along the established lines.
If Donald Trump wins, it remains to be seen whether his victory translates into a broad and permanent change in the philosophy and direction of the GOP. There is no question of 2016 being a critical election if Trump succeeds in getting his party to move in the direction he is charting: if he succeeds in associating Republicanism with a more inward-looking, pro-citizen, and anti-global ideology. In order to do this, Republicans would have to renounce their history of support for big business, which is now typically a transnational enterprise. Republicans would have to take the lead on reforming trade, recasting themselves as protectors of American workers and American industry. Hawkish Republicans would have to get in touch with their isolationist side. And the issues dear to the hearts of social conservatives would likely take a back seat to those having to do with the economy.
In most cases, a critical election is the culmination of broad and concerted changes already occurring within a political party, often in connection with the emergence of a charismatic standard-bearer. In 1860, for instance, Abraham Lincoln’s election was merely the capstone of a decades-long effort to incorporate anti-slavery into a broader platform of economic empowerment that would appeal to mainstream voters (who were white). In 1828, Andrew Jackson’s election signaled the emergence of a new kind of party that combined a desire for retrenchment and austerity with an unwavering democratic appeal. And, in 1980, Ronald Reagan’s election signified the arrival of a new kind of economic philosophy (henceforth known as ‘Reaganomics’), along with a newly potent faith-based conservatism intent on bucking certain types of modern secular change.
Trump is an outsider whose ideas the GOP mainstream has not embraced. If he is elected, it’s unclear whether, or to what extent, other leading Republicans would feel pressed take up his agenda and ideas. Republicans in the House and Senate could act in contradistinction to him. Were this to happen, the GOP as a whole would continue in a state of fragmentation and confusion. Governmental paralysis, rather than lasting partisan transformation, would be the result.
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If Trump gets elected probably not too many powerhouse GOP seat holders in either the Senate and House would “attach” themselves to his agenda. It seems to me that his agenda keeps changing, but as you succinctly wrote there are some keystones to it. . . . I think his election would usher in a time of giant turmoil within his party. He is a loose cannon but obviously millions and millions of Americans want real change and Hillary will not bring it.
Nukes. For all its many failings, the American Policy establishment, including Clinton, understands deterrence theory and MAD.
Trump does not. At best, he’s a grouchy, ill-educated version of Merkin Muffley. More likely, he’s an American analog to Khrushchev. And at worst he’s a Kremlin puppet.
So yes, 2020 will be a new election, if we make it that long.
Merkin Muffley?
Merkin Muffley, the President in Dr. Strangelove.
Have any presidents since Truman and Kennedy had to contemplate the use of a nuclear bomb? I wonder about the specific scenarios that people have in mind when they talk about this. Its main reference point seems to be that anti-Goldwater ad, “Daisy.”
Funny, the Atlantic just sketched out the most probable, involving North Korea.
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/11/trump-nuclear-north-korea/506750/
And then there’s an interesting New Yorker article on the occasion of Dr. Strangelove’s 50th anniversary: http://www.google.com/amp/www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/almost-everything-in-dr-strangelove-was-true/amp
Long story short, Strangelove got a lot of criticism from the foreign policy elite of the time: “the lady did indeed protest too much.”
We’ve been lucky so far.
But more directly in answer to your question, Truman and Kennedy presided over some of the most dangerous crises (Korea ’51/MacArthur, Cuba ’62). Eisenhower was also under pressure to use nukes to relieve Dien Boen Phu in ’54. Between ’72 and the Reagan build up in the ’80s, nuclear weapons were considered an element in NATO’s ability to deter a Soviet attack — NATO’s conventional deterrence was fairly weak vis a vis the Soviet conventional ground forces (or at least this was the conventional wisdom of the time).
In short, yes a big element of all Cold War presidents thinking — and perceived suitability for office– was how they thought about using nukes, either in ‘pushing the button’ or leveraging their value as a deterrent.
We’ve kind of forgotten about the continued existence of a Russo-American balance of terror in the 20+ years since the wall fell, but the machinery of global annihilation remains essentially in place.
Thank you, Cary. I would like to direct readers’ attention to this memorable NYR piece written by California gov. Jerry Brown on the current nuclear threat. The book under review is Wm Perry’s My Journey at the Nuclear Brink.
SB